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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s method for defining juveniles’ Eighth 
Amendment rights is a lesson in incremental decision-making. Just 
seven years ago, in Roper v. Simmons,1 the Court held that juveniles 
(those under the age of eighteen) cannot be sentenced to death.2 And 
just two years ago, in Graham v. Florida,3 the Court held that juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide crimes cannot be sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole.4 In Miller v. Alabama5 and Jackson v. Hobbs,6 
the Court will decide a third related issue: whether fourteen-year-old 
offenders convicted of capital murder may be sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole.7 
 
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Theresa 
Newman for her valuable guidance and dedication to my work. I thank Ed Boehme, Kara 
Duffle, Claire Fong, Andrew Hand, Allison Jaros, Aaron Johnson, Sarah Naseman, Boris 
Rappoport, and Mike Villegiante for their helpful comments and thorough editing. 
 1.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 2.  See id. at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the 
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”).  
 3.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 4.  See id. at 2034 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole 
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”).  
 5.  Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2012).  
 6.  Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647 (U.S. argued Mar. 20, 2012).  
 7.  These two cases were argued together before the Supreme Court on March 20, 2012. 
See October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2011/ 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012). Mr. Bryan A. Stevenson of the Equal Justice Initiative represented 
both defendants. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Defining the Contours of the 
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Seventy-three juvenile offenders are currently serving life 
sentences for crimes they committed when they were fourteen years 
old or younger.8 Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson are two such 
offenders, and they challenge their sentences under the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.9 The 
Court’s decision will turn on what carries more constitutional weight: 
the youth of these defendants or the severity of their crimes. 
II. FACTS 
A. Evan Miller 
Evan Miller is currently serving a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for a murder he committed when he was fourteen 
years old. On the night of the incident, Miller and his sixteen-year-old 
friend, Colby Smith, visited Miller’s older neighbor, Cole Cannon.10 
Miller, Smith, and Cannon smoked marijuana and played drinking 
games until Cannon passed out, at which point Miller and Smith stole 
$300 from Cannon’s wallet.11 As Miller placed the wallet back into 
Cannon’s pocket, Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat.12 
Miller struck Cannon repeatedly with a baseball bat.13 Miller then 
placed a sheet over Cannon’s head and said, “I am God. I’ve come to 
take your life.”14 Miller and Smith set fire to Cannon’s trailer,15 and 
Cannon, conscious but unable to move,16 died of smoke inhalation.17 
 
Eighth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/scotus-for-law-students-defining-the-contours-of-the-eighth-
amendment/. 
 8.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Miller, No. 10-9646 (citing EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN 
PRISON 20 (2007), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf). Since 
the publication of this report, a handful of offenders have obtained relief, but a few new 
sentences have been imposed. The figure remains relatively constant at just over seventy 
people. Id. at 3 n.1.  
 9.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  
 10.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9646).  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. (noting that Smith saw Cannon “[j]ust laying there” and heard Cannon ask, 
“Why are y’all doing this to me?” as they were leaving the burning trailer).  
 17.  See id. at 685 (noting the pathologist’s findings that Cannon died of “inhalation of 
products of combustion”).  
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Trying Miller as an adult, the Circuit Court of Alabama convicted 
Miller of capital murder.18 Under Alabama law, a person convicted of 
capital murder must be sentenced to death or life without the 
possibility of parole.19 Because Miller was not eligible for the death 
penalty,20 the trial court had no choice but to sentence Miller to life 
without the possibility of parole.21 The Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence,22 and the Alabama 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.23 
B. Kuntrell Jackson 
Kuntrell Jackson is also currently serving a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole for a crime he committed when he 
was fourteen years old. While walking through a housing project, 
Jackson and two older boys discussed robbing a video store.24 On their 
way to the store, Jackson discovered that one of the boys, Derrick 
Shields, was carrying a sawed-off shotgun in his coat sleeve.25 When 
the three boys arrived at the video store, Jackson initially waited 
outside the store but entered after Shields pointed his shotgun at the 
clerk and demanded that she “give up the money.”26 When the clerk 
replied that she had no money, Shields made his demand five or six 
more times, and each time the clerk refused.27 After the clerk 
mentioned calling the police, Shields shot the clerk in the face.28 All 
three boys fled without taking any money.29 
 
 18.  Id at 682–83. Miller was eligible for a capital murder conviction because he committed 
murder in the course of an arson. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(9) (West 2012). In exchange 
for testifying against Miller, Smith pled guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to life with 
the possibility of parole. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 7.  
 19.  See § 13A-5-39(1) (defining “capital offense” as “[a]n offense for which a defendant 
shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole”). 
 20.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting death sentences against 
those who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed). 
 21.  See State v. Miller, No. CC 2006-68, 2006 WL 6627054, at *1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2006) (“[T]he only possible punishment that the defendant may be subjected to is life without 
the possibility of parole.”), aff’d, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
548 (2011) (No. 10-9646). 
 22.  Miller, 63 So. 3d at 682.  
 23.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 1.  
 24.  Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 7 (Danielson, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. 
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).  
 25.  Id. at 7–8.  
 26.  Id. at 8. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  
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Tried as an adult,30 Jackson was convicted of capital murder and 
aggravated robbery.31 Although Jackson did not personally shoot the 
clerk, he was nevertheless eligible for a capital murder conviction 
under Arkansas’s felony murder statute.32 The trial court sentenced 
Jackson to life without the possibility of parole,33 a mandatory 
sentence in Arkansas for juveniles convicted of capital murder.34 Both 
the Court of Appeals35 and the Supreme Court of Arkansas36 affirmed 
Jackson’s sentence. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Miller and Jackson both assert two constitutional challenges to 
their sentences: first, that the Eighth Amendment categorically 
prohibits sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to life without the 
possibility of parole and, second, that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole for juveniles generally. The legal background of the two 
challenges is discussed below. 
A. Categorical Prohibition under the Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment is not static, but rather “draw[s] its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”37 In determining whether the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits a particular sentence against a 
class of people, the Court applies a two-step analysis.38 First, the Court 
determines whether there is a “national consensus against the 
sentencing practice,” looking to legislative enactments and state 
 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 1 (majority opinion).  
 32.  Id. at 8 (Danielsen, J., dissenting). 
 33.  Id. at 1 (majority opinion). 
 34.  Id. at 6 (Brown, J., concurring); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (West 
2011) (stating that if a defendant is convicted of capital murder and the death penalty is not 
sought, then the “trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole”). 
 35.  Jackson v. State, No. CA 02-535, 2003 WL 193412, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003) 
aff’d sub nom Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. 
Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647). 
 36.  Jackson, 2011 Ark. at 1.  
 37.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  
 38.  See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010) (prohibiting life without 
the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
564 (2005) (prohibiting death sentence for all juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 313 (2002) (prohibiting death sentence for mentally handicapped offenders). 
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practices for guidance.39 In finding a national consensus, the Court 
generally gives greater weight to legislative enactments than to state 
practices,40 but state practices are nevertheless important.41 Next, the 
Court determines, “in the exercise of its own independent judgment[,] 
whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.”42 In 
making an independent judgment, the Court considers three factors: 
“the culpability of the offenders,” “the severity of the punishment in 
question,” and “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves 
legitimate penological goals.”43 
In applying this two-step analysis in Graham, the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing juveniles to 
life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide crimes.44 First, 
the Court found a national consensus against the practice.45 Although 
thirty-nine jurisdictions permitted the sentence, only eleven 
jurisdictions actually imposed it.46 Second, the Court found 
independent justification for prohibiting the sentence. Regarding the 
offenders’ culpability, the Court reasoned that non-homicide juvenile 
offenders had “twice diminished moral culpability,” once for their age 
and again for the non-homicide nature of the crime.47 Regarding the 
severity of the punishment, the Court reasoned that life without the 
possibility of parole was the “second most severe penalty permitted 
by law”48 and was “especially harsh for a juvenile offender who will on 
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison 
than an adult.”49 Finally, the Court reasoned that no penological 
 
 39.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.  
 40.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's 
legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))). 
 41.  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (“Actual sentencing practices are an important part of 
the Court’s inquiry into consensus.”). 
 42.  Id. at 2022. In making an independent judgment, the court will be “guided by ‘the 
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.’” Id. (quoting 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008)). 
 43.  Id. at 2026.  
 44.  See id. at 2034 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole 
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”). 
 45.  Id. at 2026.  
 46.  See id. at 2023–24 (noting that thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia permit 
the sentence and that the federal government permits the sentence for juveniles as young as 
thirteen). At the time the Court decided Graham, only 123 juvenile offenders were serving 
sentences of life without parole for non-homicide offenses. Id. at 2024.  
 47.  Id. at 2027.  
 48.  Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).  
 49.  Id. at 2028.  
MCEVILLY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2012  9:18 PM 
236 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 7 
goal—including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation—adequately justified life without the possibility of 
parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.50 
In finding juveniles less culpable than adults, the Graham Court 
relied on three characteristics of juveniles that were relevant in 
Roper: (1) juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility;” (2) they “are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;” 
and (3) their characters are “not as well formed.”51 A question 
remains as to whether juveniles ages fourteen and younger exhibit 
these three characteristics to a greater degree, and if so, whether that 
makes them a distinct class of offenders eligible for special 
constitutional protection.52 Juveniles ages fourteen and younger were 
once a distinct class of offenders. At the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted, the common law had established the rebuttable presumption 
that juveniles ages fourteen and younger lacked the capacity to 
commit felonies, which were punishable by death.53 Juveniles in this 
age range remained a distinct class of offenders until Roper, which 
extended protection against the death penalty to all juveniles.54 
The Graham Court expressly limited its holding to non-homicide 
crimes, noting that “[t]here is a line ‘between homicide and other 
serious violent offenses against the individual.’”55 The Court gave 
special status to the non-homicide offenders’ state of mind, noting 
that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will 
be taken are categorically less deserving of punishment than are 
murderers.”56 
B. Mandatory Sentencing under the Eighth Amendment 
A mandatory sentence is a sentence that a court must impose, 
regardless of mitigating circumstances. In both Alabama and 
 
 50.  Id. at 2030 (“In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole 
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.”).  
 51.  Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).  
 52.  See discussion infra Part IVA.2 (discussing arguments in favor of finding a categorical 
prohibition).  
 53.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).   
 54.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555–56 (“This case requires us to address . . . whether it is 
permissible . . . to execute a juvenile offender who was . . . younger than 18 when he committed 
a capital crime. In [Stanford v. Kentucky], a divided Court rejected the proposition that the 
Constitution bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders in this age group.”).  
 55.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008)).  
 56.  Id.  
MCEVILLY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2012  9:18 PM 
2012] CRYING MERCY 237 
Arkansas, the states in which Miller and Jackson were sentenced, life 
without the possibility of parole is a mandatory sentence for juvenile 
offenders convicted of capital murder.57 While mandatory sentencing 
ensures that offenders convicted of the same crime receive the same 
punishment, it may nevertheless be cruel and unusual (and thus 
unconstitutional) insofar as mitigating circumstances, such as extreme 
youth, cannot be considered. 
Unlike death sentences, sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole can be mandatory, at least for adult offenders. In Harmelin v. 
Michigan,58 the Court affirmed a mandatory sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole for an adult offender, holding that 
individualized sentencing is required only for death sentences.59 The 
Court found “no comparable [individualized-sentencing] requirement 
outside the capital context[] because of the qualitative difference 
between death and all other penalties.”60 The death penalty is unique 
in “its total irrevocability,” “its rejection of rehabilitation,” and “its 
absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of 
humanity.”61 Acknowledging that life without the possibility of parole 
can result in extremely long sentences, the Court nevertheless noted 
that “even where the difference is greatest, [life without the possibility 
of parole] cannot be compared with death.”62 
Graham, however, while not a case about mandatory sentencing, 
was decided after Harmelin and stressed the importance of 
considering an offender’s age. The Court noted that “[a]n offender’s 
age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure 
laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all 
would be flawed.”63 Merely considering a defendant’s age in the 
defendant’s transfer from juvenile court to adult court is potentially 
insufficient under Graham, because legislators may not have intended 
juvenile offenders to receive the same punishment as adult 
offenders.64 
 
 57.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (West 2011); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39(1) (West 
2012).  
 58.  501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 59.  Id. at 996.  
 60.  Id. at 995.  
 61.  Id. at 995–96 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)).  
 62.  Id. at 996. 
 63.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010).  
 64.  See id. at 2025 (“[T]he fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without 
parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not justify a judgment that many 
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IV. ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION 
As in Graham, the Court in Miller and Jackson will likely apply its 
two-step analysis to determine whether the Eighth Amendment 
categorically prohibits sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders 
convicted of capital murder to life without the possibility of parole. 
Arguments for and against this categorical prohibition are discussed 
below. 
A. Arguments for a Categorical Prohibition 
1. National Consensus 
The two-step analysis begins with identifying a national consensus. 
Although thirty-six states permit sentencing fourteen-year-old 
offenders to life without the possibility of parole,65 only eighteen 
states have ever imposed this sentence,66 and ten of these states have 
only imposed it once or twice.67 Moreover, only seventy-three 
offenders are currently serving sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole for crimes they committed when they were 
fourteen years old or younger.68 This number is remarkably low, 
considering that it reflects nearly all juvenile offenders who have 
received a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence stretching 
back many decades.69 
Evidence of a national consensus against a sentence is “not 
undermined” by the fact that most states legislatively allow that 
sentence.70 Although thirty-six states allow life without the possibility 
 
States intended to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences.”). Depending on the 
state, a juvenile court may transfer a juvenile to the district court in the case of certain major 
crimes and where the juvenile is of a certain age. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
318(c)(2)(A), (E), (G) (West 2011) (permitting a fourteen-year-old offender to be transferred to 
the district court if he or she committed capital murder, rape, or a terrorist attack). In 
determining whether to grant the transfer, the juvenile court generally considers the seriousness 
of the crime and the maturity of the offender. See e.g., ALA. CODE. § 12-15-203(d)(1), (5) (2012) 
(listing as factors “the nature of the present alleged offense” and “the extent and nature of the 
physical and mental maturity of the child”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g)(1), (6) (listing as 
factors “the seriousness of the offense” and “the sophistication or maturity of the juvenile”).  
 65.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 687 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9646).  
 66.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 3. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id.  
 69.  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (“It becomes all the more clear how rare these 
sentences are, even within the jurisdictions that do sometimes impose them, when one considers 
that a juvenile sentenced to life without parole is likely to live in prison for decades.”). 
 70.  See id. at 2023, 2025 (finding a national consensus against sentencing juvenile non-
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of parole for fourteen-year-old offenders, in most of these states, the 
legislatures never expressly authorize life-without-the-possibility-of-
parole sentences for fourteen-year-old offenders.71 Rather, legislatures 
lower the requirements for transferring juveniles to adult court, and 
courts then directly charge juveniles as if they were adults.72 That a 
majority of states allow life without the possibility of parole for 
fourteen-year-old offenders shows that these states consider these 
offenders to be “old enough to be tried in criminal court for serious 
crimes (or too old to be dealt with effectively in juvenile court), but 
tells us nothing about the judgment these States have made regarding 
the appropriate punishment for such youthful offenders.”73 
2. Independent Justification 
The two-step analysis concludes with the Court’s “own 
independent judgment,”74 which is influenced by the offenders’ 
culpability, the severity of the sentence, and whether the sentence 
serves legitimate penological goals.75 
First, under the Roper standard, fourteen-year-old offenders have 
less culpability than other juveniles. Recent scientific research shows 
that young juveniles, as compared to older juveniles, are (1) less 
mature and experience an “increase in reward seeking” at puberty;76 
(2) more susceptible to peer pressure, which reaches “an all-time high 
in eighth grade,” particularly in boys;77 and (3) in earlier stages of 
developing their character, giving them a “great[er] capacity for 
change.”78 
 
 
homicide offenders to life without the possibility of parole despite the fact that thirty-nine 
jurisdictions legislatively allowed this sentence).  
 71.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 3. 
 72.  See id. (“[S]uch sentences are a byproduct of legislation expanding the susceptibility of 
juveniles to adult prosecution.”). 
 73.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2025 (“[T]he fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without 
parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not justify a judgment that many 
States intended to subject such offenders to life without parole sentences.”).  
 74.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.  
 75.  Id. at 2026.  
 76.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting Laurence Steinberg et al., 
Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report, 44 
DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008)).  
 77.  Id. at 16 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of 
Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841, 846, 848 (1986)).  
 78.  Id. at 18 (citing, among other sources, Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in 
Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009)). 
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Second, life without the possibility of parole is too severe a 
punishment for fourteen-year-old offenders. While the crime of 
murder is especially serious, the punishment in question is very 
harsh—this younger subset of juveniles “will on average serve more 
years and a greater percentage of [their] li[ves] in prison” than 
juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen.79 
Third, no penological goal justifies life without the possibility of 
parole for fourteen-year-old offenders. The Court in Graham found 
that no penological goal—including retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—justified life without the possibility 
of parole for non-homicide offenders.80 As the difference between 
homicide and non-homicide offenses can turn on as little as whether a 
victim survives, and not on the offender’s actions or state of mind,81 
the only penological goal that is potentially furthered in homicide 
offenses, but not in many non-homicide offenses, is retribution.82 A 
retribution rationale, however, requires “that a criminal sentence . . . 
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal 
offender.”83 As fourteen-year-old offenders have at least several 
characteristics that make them less culpable, their level of culpability 
is insufficient to justify a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole based solely on a retribution rationale. 
B. Arguments against a Categorical Prohibition 
1. No National Consensus 
In finding a national consensus, the Court generally gives greater 
weight to legislative enactments than to state practices.84 Here, thirty-
six states legislatively permit sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders 
 
 79.  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (noting that life without the possibility of parole is a 
harsher sentence for juveniles than for adults). 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (“A person is guilty of attempt to commit a 
crime if . . . he . . . does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief 
that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part.” (emphasis added)).     
 82.  For example, an offender who shoots and misses is theoretically just as culpable and 
dangerous as an offender who shoots and connects, so both offenders are in equal need of 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But if the shooter’s victim dies, then the victim’s 
family and community may demand retribution to a greater extent than if the victim had never 
been harmed. Thus, retribution is the only goal that turns in part on the crime’s result, and not 
solely on the offender’s conduct or state of mind. 
 83.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 84.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“We have pinpointed that the 
‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted 
by the country's legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))). 
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to life without the possibility of parole.85 Although most of these states 
do not expressly authorize this punishment for fourteen-year-old 
offenders, the Court presumes that legislators are “aware of existing 
law when [they] pass[] legislation.”86 To claim that legislators “do not 
know the consequences of their actions in light of the entire legal 
framework” would allow courts to invalidate and rewrite any 
legislation in accordance with what they believe is a proper legal 
framework.87 If the legislators did not intend to sentence fourteen-
year-old offenders to life without the possibility of parole, they would 
have expressly carved out such an exception, as some state legislators 
have done.88 
2. No Independent Justification 
No independent justification exists for a categorical prohibition 
against sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to life without the 
possibility of parole. First, although juveniles have less culpability 
given their age, those juveniles who commit homicide offenses lack 
the “twice diminished moral culpability” found in Graham because 
the nature of their crimes is far more serious.89 Also, same the author 
of the research showing diminished culpability in younger juveniles 
warned that “[w]hen lawmakers focus on juvenile justice policy, the 
distinction between adolescence and adulthood, rather than that 
between childhood and adolescence, is of primary interest.”90 
Second, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, while 
severe, is proportional to the crime of capital murder. As Chief Justice 
Roberts explained in the concurring opinion in Graham, “there is 
nothing inherently unconstitutional about imposing sentences of life 
without parole on juvenile offenders; rather, the constitutionality of 
 
 85.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 687 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9646).  
 86.  See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (referring to Congress and not 
legislators generally). 
 87.  See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition at 17–18, Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-
9646 (U.S. June 1, 2011) (“This assumption goes directly counter to this Court’s assumption that 
legislatures understand the consequences of the interplay of specific acts with the surrounding 
legal landscape.”).  
 88.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-104(IV) (West 2012) (prohibiting life 
without the possibility of parole for any juvenile).   
 89.  See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (“The age of the offender and the 
nature of the crime each bear on the analysis.”).  
 90.  Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition, supra note 87, at 20–21 (quoting 
Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 47, 53 (2009)).  
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such sentences depends on the particular crimes for which they are 
imposed.”91 Focusing on Miller’s crimes, for example, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Alabama noted that “such a sentence is not 
overly harsh,”92 especially in light of the “intentional and horrendous 
crime.”93 
Third, sentencing a fourteen-year-old offender to life without the 
possibility of parole serves at least one penological goal: retribution. 
Although this goal is inadequate with respect to non-homicide 
offenders,94 “death is different.”95 When a victim dies, the community 
generally feels a greater sense of outrage and sadness than if a victim 
survives. Retribution can be viewed as providing a service that 
ameliorates the suffering of the community and, in particular, the 
homicide survivors.96 To rebalance the moral scale, the state imposes 
the second harshest sentence for one of the worst crimes.97 
V. ARGUMENTS REGARDING MANDATORY SENTENCING 
Should the Court find against a categorical prohibition, then 
Miller and Jackson argue in the alternative that juveniles facing life 
without the possibility of parole are constitutionally entitled to 
individualized sentencing, a right afforded to adults facing the death 
penalty.98 In other words, Miller and Jackson argue that a mandatory 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders 
is unconstitutional. Arguments for and against finding such 
mandatory sentences unconstitutional are discussed below. 
A. Arguments that Mandatory Sentencing is Unconstitutional 
In Alabama and Arkansas, when a juvenile is convicted of capital 
murder, the juvenile is automatically sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole.99 This mandatory sentencing means that the court 
 
 91.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
 92.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9646).  
 93.  Id. at 689.  
 94.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 95.  Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 96.  Marilyn Peterson Amour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal Sanction and 
‘Closure’ for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 394 (2007).   
 97.  Miller, 63 So. 3d at 690–91.  
 98.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“[A]n individualized decision is essential 
in capital cases.”). 
 99.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (West 2011); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39(1) (West 
2012).  
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cannot consider any mitigating circumstances, including the juvenile’s 
age. Although the Harmelin Court upheld a mandatory sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole, the Graham Court subsequently 
stressed the importance of considering a defendant’s age in 
sentencing: “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, 
and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness 
into account at all would be flawed.”100 Considering a juvenile’s age in 
transferring juveniles to adult court is insufficient under Graham 
because legislators may not have intended that all transferred 
juveniles receive the same punishment as adults. Legislators may have 
simply recognized that some juveniles are “too old to be dealt with 
effectively in juvenile court.”101 
Since Graham, several state court judges have expressed concern 
about imposing mandatory life sentence on juvenile offenders. 
Dissenting in Jackson’s case on appeal, Judge Danielson, joined by 
Judge Corbin, stated that he would find Jackson’s sentence 
unconstitutional in part because “the circuit court could not consider 
the defendant’s age or any other mitigating circumstances—the circuit 
court only had jurisdiction to sentence Jackson to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.”102 Likewise, in a dissent in State v. 
Andrews,103 Judge Wolff concluded that Missouri’s sentencing 
mandate violates the Eighth Amendment, reasoning that “[t]he 
imposition of a life sentence without parole—without consideration 
of Andrews’ age—fails to ensure that Andrews’ sentence is 
proportional to his crime.”104 
B. Arguments that Mandatory Sentencing is Constitutional 
The Court has already held that a mandatory sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole is constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment. In Harmelin, the Court upheld a mandatory sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole imposed on an adult offender, 
finding that the Eighth Amendment does not require individualized 
sentencing or consideration of mitigating circumstances except in 
death penalty cases.105 Though the defendant in Harmelin was an 
 
 100.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 101.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 102.  Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 10–11 (Danielson, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub 
nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647). 
 103.  329 S.W.3d 369 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 104.  Id. at 388 (Wolff, J., dissenting).  
 105.  See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (“Our cases creating and clarifying 
MCEVILLY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2012  9:18 PM 
244 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 7 
adult, the Court noted that even very long sentences of life without 
the possibility of parole are different than the death penalty: “[i]n 
some cases . . . there will be negligible difference between life without 
parole and other sentences of imprisonment . . . . But even where the 
difference is the greatest, it cannot be compared with death.”106 At 
least one circuit has upheld a mandatory sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole against a juvenile offender,107 and no circuit has 
held that this mandatory sentence is unconstitutional.108 
V. DISCUSSION 
Miller and Jackson’s best hope for relief lies in the Court finding a 
categorical prohibition. If the Court applies the two-step analysis in 
Miller and Jackson as it did in Graham, then it will likely find that the 
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing fourteen-year-
old offenders to life without the possibility of parole. Should the 
Court not find a categorical prohibition, however, then Miller and 
Jackson might remain in prison for the rest of their natural lives. The 
Court will likely uphold mandatory sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, leaving individualized 
sentencing in the realm of public policy. 
A.  Categorical Prohibition 
1. National Consensus 
Regarding the first step of the two-step analysis, the Court will 
likely find a national consensus against sentencing fourteen-year-old 
offenders to life without the possibility of parole. The figures 
supporting a national consensus here are similar to the figures in 
Graham, which persuaded the Court that “[t]he sentencing practice 
[then] under consideration [was] exceedingly rare.”109 At the time 
Graham was decided, thirty-nine jurisdictions allowed sentences of 
life without the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide 
offenders, but only eleven jurisdictions actually imposed the 
 
the ‘individualized capital sentencing doctrine’ have repeatedly suggested that there is no 
comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference 
between death and all other penalties.”).  
 106.  Id. at 996.  
 107.  Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 568 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 108.  See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition, supra note 87, at 24 (“Miller has 
asserted no split on this issue . . . .”).  
 109.  See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (finding that the sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders was “exceedingly rare”).   
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sentence.110 Here, thirty-six jurisdictions allow fourteen-year-old 
offenders to be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,111 
but only eighteen jurisdictions have actually imposed this sentence.112 
Also, in Graham, 123 offenders were serving the sentence,113 as 
compared to only 73 offenders here.114 Thus, as compared to the 
sentence considered in Graham, sentencing fourteen-year-old 
offenders to life without the possibility of parole is allowed in fewer 
states and has impacted fewer offenders. And although more states 
have actually imposed this sentence, ten of these states have imposed 
it no more than twice.115 Presented with figures similar to those in 
Graham, if not more compelling, the Court will likely find a national 
consensus. 
2. Independent Justification 
Regarding the second step of the two-step analysis, the Court will 
likely find an independent justification for a categorical prohibition. 
First, fourteen-year-old offenders are less culpable than older 
juveniles in the three constitutionally relevant ways described in 
Roper.116 Recent scientific research shows that young juveniles, as 
compared to older juveniles, are less mature, more susceptible to peer 
pressure, and in earlier stages of developing their character.117 With 
distinctly lessened culpability, fourteen-year-old offenders may again 
be considered a distinct class of offenders, as they were before 
Roper.118 
Second, the Court will likely hold that a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole is too severe for fourteen-year-old offenders 
convicted of capital murder. While the crime before the Court is more 
 
 110.  Id. at 2023–24. 
 111.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 687 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9646). 
 112.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 20.  
 113.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.  
 114.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 3 (citing EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 20 
(2007), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf). 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (noting that juveniles are less 
culpable than adults because they lack maturity, are susceptible to peer pressure, and have 
developing characters); see also supra text accompanying note 51 (listing Roper’s three 
characteristics verbatim).  
 117.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 15–16, 18. 
 118.  See supra text accompanying notes 53–54 (providing a brief history of the age-fourteen 
threshold). 
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serious than that in Graham, the punishment before the Court is also 
harsher—the class of offenders is younger and thus “will on average 
serve more years and a greater percentage of [their] li[ves] in prison” 
than the juveniles in Graham.119 At the very least, the severity of the 
punishment in light of the crime is comparable to that in Graham, 
especially given that the difference between a homicide and a non-
homicide conviction can turn on as little as whether the victim 
survives.120 
Third, the Court will likely find that no penological goal justifies 
life without the possibility of parole for fourteen-year-old offenders. 
Again, the difference between a homicide and a non-homicide 
conviction can turn on factors unrelated to the offender’s actions or 
state of mind. Because deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 
turn on the offender’s actions and state of mind (and not the crime’s 
result), these goals are just as inadequate as they were in Graham.121 
To illustrate, the facts of Graham are not very different from the facts 
in Jackson, except that the victim in Graham survived. While Graham 
and his accomplice were robbing a restaurant, the accomplice struck 
the restaurant manager twice in the back of the head with a metal 
bar.122 Graham and his accomplice then fled without taking any 
money.123 Given that “Jackson’s involvement in the robbery was no 
more, if not less than, Graham’s involvement,”124 the Court cannot 
justify sentencing Jackson to life without the possibility of parole 
while denying the same sentence for Graham, especially while relying 
on goals that turn only on the offender’s actions or state of mind. 
The only remaining penological goal at issue before the Court, 
then, is retribution. Retribution is different from the other three goals 
because it is rooted, in part, in the crime’s result. Retribution provides 
an avenue for the victim’s family and community to express outrage 
and sadness over the crime, so the need for retribution 
correspondingly increases or decreases depending upon the crime’s 
 
 119.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010). 
 120.  See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing the minimal difference 
between homicide and non-homicide crimes with respect to the offender’s actions and state of 
mind).   
 121.  See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing how deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation turn on the offender’s actions and state of mind rather than on 
the crime’s result).  
 122.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 10 (Danielson, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. 
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647). 
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severity.125 But because “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that 
a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender,”126 retribution cannot stand alone 
as an adequate justification. Certainly, the crime before the Court is 
more serious than the crime considered in Graham. In Graham, the 
restaurant manager only needed stitches127 whereas here, one victim 
died of smoke inhalation128 and the other died of a gun wound to the 
head.129 But the offenders here were only fourteen at the time of their 
wrongdoing and almost certainly less culpable than the older offender 
in Graham. This should weigh heavily against any need to exact 
retribution. At the very least, the role of retribution is comparable to 
its role in Graham, and the Court may safely find that retribution 
alone does not adequately justify the sentence. 
B. Mandatory Sentencing 
Should the Court find against a categorical prohibition, however, 
it must then address Miller and Jackson’s argument in the alternative, 
that a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
against juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment. This 
argument will likely prove unsuccessful. 
The Court has “drawn the line of required individualized 
sentencing at capital cases, and [has seen] no basis for extending it 
further.”130 The Court has expressly recognized that sentences of life 
without the possibility of parole can be very long and has still never 
required individualized sentencing.131 Instead of regarding 
individualized sentencing as a constitutional requirement, the Court 
has regarded it as a matter of public policy, an issue to be decided by 
 
 125.  See Amour & Umbreit, supra note 96, at 394 (describing how retribution could be 
viewed as “provid[ing] a service that ameliorates suffering for homicide survivors”).  
 126.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 23 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2028). 
 127.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.  
 128.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 685 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (noting the pathologist’s 
findings that Cannon died of “inhalation of products of combustion”), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
548 (2011) (No. 10-9646). 
 129.  Jackson, 2011 Ark. at 8 (Danielson, J., dissenting).   
 130.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).  
 131.  See, e.g., id. (“[E]ven where the difference is the greatest, [life without the possibility of 
parole] cannot be compared with death.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) 
(“Because a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how 
long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases 
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  
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the states according to their needs and views.132 Judge Brown 
recognized this deference in his concurring opinion in Jackson, in 
which he sought recourse with the General Assembly of Arkansas 
rather than finding a violation of the Constitution.133 
The Court may hesitate to further extend Graham’s requirement 
that age be taken into account in criminal procedure laws. Graham 
was not a case about mandatory sentencing, and this requirement 
contradicts many cases that are.134 Moreover, Graham only requires 
that criminal procedure laws not “fail to take defendants’ 
youthfulness into account at all.”135 Taking a defendant’s youthfulness 
into account in the transfer from juvenile court to adult court 
arguably satisfies this minimal requirement. 
While sound public policy reasons exist for granting individualized 
sentencing to juveniles facing life without the possibility of parole, the 
Court will not likely hold that this is a constitutional requirement, 
even for fourteen-year-old offenders. For the state legislators that 
choose not to create individual sentencing requirements, the Court 
will rely on the fact that, unlike a death sentence, life without the 
possibility of parole does not foreclose all avenues for reducing a 
sentence, “since there remain the possibilities of retroactive legislative 
reduction and executive clemency.”136 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will likely create a new 
categorical prohibition on sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to 
 
 132.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (“We recognize that, in noncapital 
cases, the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, 
but on public policy enacted into statutes.”); see also Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 568 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (“[W]e live in a world where juvenile offenders are committing violent crimes with 
increasing frequency. . . . [Illinois] took an affirmative step toward deterring violent juvenile 
offenders in its state . . . . We refuse to substitute our judgment for that of the Illinois 
legislature.”). 
 133.  See Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, at 7 (Brown, J., concurring) (“The General 
Assembly should examine this part of the criminal code to determine whether a sentencing 
hearing is appropriate before a mandatory sentence of life without parole is imposed on [a 
juvenile offender] and when the basis for the conviction is not premeditated murder but felony 
murder.”), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647). 
 134.  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (upholding a mandatory sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole due to the dissimilarity between this sentence and a death sentence); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 105–08 (discussing the facts and holding of Harmelin).   
 135.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010).  
 136.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996. 
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life without the possibility of parole. If it does not, however, then 
Miller and Jackson may very well be imprisoned for the rest of their 
natural lives. To Miller and Jackson’s detriment, the Court will likely 
uphold mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole 
for juvenile offenders. 
The Court has defined juveniles’ Eighth Amendment rights 
through incremental decision-making. What kind of cases can we 
expect to come before the Court after Miller and Jackson? An issue 
left undecided here is whether juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen also 
deserve protection against sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole. With a slow but steady shift in national consensus, this issue 
will undoubtedly present itself before the Court in time. And in this 
way, slowly and step-by-step, the Court will continue to define (or 
expand) the boundaries of juveniles’ Eighth Amendments rights. 
 
